DAILY Ex - 10 OCTOBER 2026

⚡ DAILY Ex - 10 OCTOBER 2026

Explosion Protection | Operational Ex | Global Watch

Today's focus: Maintenance, human error and the barriers that should prevent an explosion.

A fatal refinery incident in Greece leads today's edition. We also examine a newly published US investigation that identifies a particularly important failure: hazardous gas entered an operating furnace after two isolation valves were opened.

The message for Heads of Operations is clear: procedures, certificates and competent personnel matter, but serious hazards also need reliable engineering controls.

▶️ 1. GREECE

BREAKING FOLLOW-UP | 9 October 2026

One contractor died and another remained seriously injured following an incident at the https://www.moh.gr/en/ in Agioi Theodoroi, west of Athens.

Initial reports described an explosion that seriously injured two workers. Reuters subsequently confirmed, citing the company, that one worker had died.

Both workers were employed by a contractor and were undertaking maintenance activities. The company reported no refinery fire or significant damage, and said operations continued. Authorities are investigating the circumstances. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/one-person-dies-one-serious-condition-after-greek-refinery-incident-2026-10-09/

Why it matters operationally

The absence of major plant damage does not mean an incident was minor.

Maintenance activities can introduce hazards involving isolation, residual pressure, trapped flammable substances, electrical energy and unexpected equipment operation.

The investigation has not yet established which, if any, contributed to this accident.

Head of Operations lesson: Before authorising hazardous maintenance, verify the actual isolation and energy state—not simply the existence of a permit.

▶️ 2. USA - HOW TWO VALVES CAUSED A $95 MILLION EXPLOSION

RECENT INVESTIGATION | Final report: 16 September 2026

The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board has published its final investigation into the June 2025 explosion at Shell Polymers Monaca, Pennsylvania.

The findings deserve attention.

A control engineer inadvertently opened two motor-operated valves, allowing flammable cracked gas to flow backwards into a furnace containing lit pilots. An explosion followed approximately six minutes later.

The investigation identified three significant weaknesses: inadequate task-specific experience, excessive reliance on administrative controls and an HMI displaying nearly identical valves.

Estimated property damage: $95 million. Fortunately, no fatalities occurred. https://www.csb.gov/us-chemical-safety-board-releases-final-investigation-report-on-2025-explosion-and-fire-at-shell-polymers-monaca-facility-in-pennsylvania/?_bhlid=e728c9357b15ac4e78f7c6bdb7416674d2d0e216

Why it matters operationally

The facility relied on 11 administrative controls to prevent this hazardous condition.

But engineered safeguards capable of preventing backflow were available and had not been configured for that operating mode.

Operational lesson: Where a credible scenario can cause catastrophic consequences, procedures and training should not be the only barriers.

▶️ 3. UK - PROPOSED CHANGE TO Ex STANDARDS DESIGNATION

CURRENT REGULATORY WATCH | Publication proposed for 22 October

The UK government has published proposal 0144/26, addressing designated standards for equipment intended for explosive atmospheres.

The proposal concerns:

* EN IEC 60079-28:2026 - protection using optical radiation.

* Continued presumption of conformity under EN 60079-28:2015 until 4 March 2028, as specified in the proposal.

The proposed publication date is 22 October 2026. This is not yet a completed designation change. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6ab3f7cea9c3d267bcccedd7/ds-0144-26-atex-proposal-to-amend.pdf

Why it matters operationally

Manufacturers and certification teams need to distinguish between the latest IEC edition, EU harmonisation and UK designation.

A newly published standard does not automatically become the applicable legal conformity route everywhere.

▶️ 4. SWEDEN - BIOMASS EXPLOSION PROTECTION

RECENT INDUSTRY EVENT | 8 October

https://www.rsbp.cz/ and https://nextech.dk/EN/explosion-protection/ scheduled a joint technical presentation at Biomass PowerON 2026 in Stockholm.

Their subject: integrated fire and explosion protection for biomass storage, conveying, filtration and milling.

The manufacturers emphasise combining certified protective equipment with engineering and system integration. https://www.rsbp.cz/es/obecne-informace/biomass-poweron-2026

Why it matters operationally

A certified explosion vent does not necessarily prevent flame propagation into connected equipment.

A properly designed protection system may require detection, isolation, venting or suppression, depending on the assessed scenario.

Protect the process, not just the individual vessel.

▶️ 5. RESEARCH - HYDROGEN EXPLOSIONS IN SEMI-CONFINED SPACES

2026 RESEARCH | China

A study in the Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries examines an improved TNO multi-energy approach using computational fluid dynamics for hydrogen explosion assessment.

The researchers propose a modelling framework for predicting explosion consequences in semi-confined environments.

The work addresses the difficulty of applying simplified explosion models to geometrically complex situations. https://eurekamag.com/research/107/908/107908830.php

Why it matters operationally

A hydrogen release near pipe racks, equipment shelters or partially enclosed structures may behave differently from one in open space.

Congestion and confinement can influence the consequences.

Operational lesson: Check whether the assumptions behind the explosion assessment represent the actual installation geometry.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2026.106090

▶️ 6. COMPETENCE - KNOWING THE PROCEDURE IS NOT ENOUGH

| Reinforced by the CSB findings

Consider the person assigned to modify a control-system configuration.

They have attended the training.

They have access to the procedure.

They are authorised to work on the system.

But have they demonstrated competence for that particular task?

The Shell investigation illustrates why this distinction matters.

For Ex installations, the same principle applies to installation, inspection, defect assessment, repair and modification.

Training → demonstrated competence → task-specific authorisation → supervision where necessary → verification.

IECEx personnel certification and other competence schemes can support this process, but the operator must still establish suitability for the actual assignment.

https://www.iecex.com/resources-and-news/operational-od/

▶️ 7. OPERATIONAL Ex USE CASE - INSTRUMENT AIR FAILURE

PRACTICAL

A chemical plant experiences intermittent instrument-air pressure problems.

Maintenance connects an alternative compressed-air supply.

The pneumatic valves respond again.

Production continues.

Problem solved?

Not necessarily.

Some valves may have been designed to move to a particular safe position when instrument air is lost.

The alternative supply could affect pressure stability, air quality or the response of safety-related valves.

The key questions are:

What happens when air pressure falls?

Which valves fail open, closed or remain in position?

Are the protective functions still available?

Has the alternative supply been assessed and authorised?

Has the complete function been verified before continued operation?

Operational lesson: Restoring equipment operation does not automatically restore the intended safety function.

▶️ 8. NEXT WEEK - LEARNING FROM UNEXPECTED IGNITION SOURCES

UPCOMING | Germany - 14–15 October

The European Process Safety Centre technical meeting in Cologne includes a particularly relevant presentation:

“Water as an ignition source: explosion during high pressure cleaning.”

Other sessions address LPG pressure-relief events, rupture discs and explosion protection for small production units. https://www.epsc.be/events/event-detail/14/epsc-technical-meeting-14-15-october-2026-in-cologne/schedule

The programme is a reminder that cleaning, maintenance and other non-production activities can introduce hazards not present during normal operation.

▶️ TODAY'S Ex QUESTION

“Which of our potentially catastrophic explosion scenarios depend primarily on people following a procedure?”

Select one scenario from the HAZOP or explosion-protection assessment.

Identify its preventive barriers.

Then ask:

Which barriers are engineered?

Which depend on human action?

Which are independently verified?

What happens if someone makes a mistake?

If the answer is that a single incorrect action could defeat the protection, the next management decision should be clear: review whether a stronger engineered safeguard is reasonably practicable and required.

DAILY Ex | CLOSING THOUGHT

We often investigate what a person did immediately before an accident.

But the more important engineering question may be:

Why was the system capable of becoming dangerous because of that action?

A competent person can make a mistake.

A well-written procedure can be misunderstood.

A correctly certified device can be used in an unsafe system.

Operational Ex is about maintaining the complete set of barriers that prevents these situations from becoming explosions.