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Author: Veress Árpád · Explosion-protection expertDAILY Ex - 12 NOVEMBER 2026
TODAY'S FOCUS: A small gas leak can become a major operational failure. A fatal explosion at a Libyan gas complex leads today's edition. We also examine a European ATEX standards update, a new application for Ex-certified wireless monitoring, hydrogen explosion research and the importance of controlling safety-critical maintenance. For Heads of Operations: Equipment availability matters, but the condition of the barriers protecting that equipment matters more.
⚡ DAILY Ex | 12 NOVEMBER 2026
Explosion Protection | Operational Ex | Global Watch
TODAY'S FOCUS: A small gas leak can become a major operational failure.
A fatal explosion at a Libyan gas complex leads today's edition. We also examine a European ATEX standards update, a new application for Ex-certified wireless monitoring, hydrogen explosion research and the importance of controlling safety-critical maintenance.
For Heads of Operations: Equipment availability matters, but the condition of the barriers protecting that equipment matters more.
🔴 1. LIBYA | Gas complex explosion kills worker
NEW INCIDENT · 11 NOVEMBER
A fire and explosion at Sirte Oil Company's gas complex in Marsa Brega killed one worker and injured four.
Libya's National Oil Corporation reported that preliminary information indicated a leak in a gas line supplying a boiler. Firefighters contained the fire, and the facility was shut down while gas lines were isolated.
Repairs are expected to take at least two weeks. The NOC chairman also warned about the consequences of delayed maintenance and insufficient budgets. The initiating sequence remains subject to investigation.
Why it matters operationally: A localised gas-line failure can cause fatalities, damage and prolonged downtime even when wider production supplies remain unaffected.
Management action: Review boiler fuel-gas systems, leak-testing records, isolation valves, pipe supports and maintenance backlogs.
⚖️ 2. EU | ATEX harmonised standards transition
REGULATORY UPDATE · 10 NOVEMBER
Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2026/2480 adds EN IEC 60079-15:2019 with amendment A11:2026 to the harmonised standards supporting Directive 2014/34/EU, covering equipment protection by type of protection 'n'.
The older EN 60079-15:2010 reference is scheduled for withdrawal on 10 May 2028.
Why it matters operationally: New procurement and certification projects need the correct technical basis. This does not mean every existing Ex n installation must be replaced.
Management action: Check the standards register, supplier declarations and conformity-assessment documentation.
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2026/2480/oj/eng
⚙️ 3. GLOBAL | Ex-certified wireless condition monitoring
MANUFACTURER TECHNOLOGY · FEBRUARY 2026
IMI introduced its NEON Sonic sensor for monitoring steam traps and pressure-relief equipment using acoustic and temperature measurements.
The manufacturer reports IECEx/ATEX Zone 0 certification, wireless LoRaWAN communications and battery-powered operation.
Why it matters operationally: Wireless monitoring can reduce manual inspection exposure and help detect deteriorating equipment before failure.
However, an Ex-certified monitoring device is not automatically a certified protective shutdown system.
Management action: Verify the exact certificate and marking, installation conditions, alarm management and whether monitoring is advisory or safety-critical.
https://fluidhandlingmag.com/news/imi-launches-new-neon-sonic-sensor-for-steam-trap-monitoring-2/
🔬 4. HYDROGEN | Delayed ignition creates blast and fireball hazards
RESEARCH · MARCH 2026
Air Products and BakerRisk researchers published experimental findings from more than 20 delayed-ignition hydrogen jet-release tests.
The work examines blast overpressure and fireball development across different release conditions, including lower-pressure, non-choked releases.
Why it matters operationally: Hydrogen release consequences cannot be assessed using gas dispersion alone. Ignition timing, release velocity, congestion and thermal effects influence the hazard.
Management action: Revisit hydrogen vent-stack locations, discharge directions, separation distances and emergency isolation assumptions where relevant.
https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.70026
📘 5. BRAZIL | Moisture and molten metal - a different explosion mechanism
HISTORICAL INCIDENT LEARNING · 28 OCTOBER 2026
An explosion at CSN's Volta Redonda steelworks was attributed in the company's preliminary account to hot molten material contacting excessive moisture during pig-iron discharge.
Firefighters reported no casualties. The investigation was ongoing.
Why it matters operationally: Not every industrial explosion involves a combustible gas or dust cloud. Water–molten-metal interactions require their own preventive engineering measures.
Management action: Review moisture exclusion, drainage, material preparation and operating procedures around molten-metal transfer.
📅 6. UK | Hazards 36 next week
UPCOMING · 17–19 NOVEMBER
IChemE's Hazards 36 conference in Manchester will address major-hazard management, leadership, new technologies and practical process-safety lessons.
The programme includes barrier assurance, hydrogen, ammonia, battery energy storage and digitalisation.
Why it matters operationally: These developments create new interfaces between process design, machinery, operational competence and explosion protection.
https://www.icheme.org/training-events/hazards-process-safety-conference/
▶️ OPERATIONAL Ex USE CASE
THE BOILER FUEL-GAS LINE - WHEN A SMALL LEAK BECOMES A SHUTDOWN
A chemical plant operates a gas-fired thermal-oil heater supplying several production units.
During routine inspection, maintenance identifies a minor leak at a fuel-gas connection. Production pressure is stable, the burner operates normally and no fixed detector has activated.
The team proposes tightening the connection during the next planned shutdown.
What is the critical decision?
A known gas leak is not acceptable merely because the equipment remains operational or the detector has not alarmed.
The assessment must consider the release location, ventilation, potential ignition sources, gas-detection coverage, isolation capability and whether safe continued operation can be demonstrated under an approved procedure.
Required action: Establish a safe state, isolate the affected section where necessary, investigate the defect and verify leak-tightness before authorising return to service.
Owner: Operations Manager, supported by Maintenance and Process Safety.
Evidence: Leak investigation, repair records, pressure or leak test as applicable, isolation verification and return-to-service authorisation.
STOP criterion: No continued operation where an uncontrolled fuel-gas release cannot be shown to be safely managed.
Performance measure: 100% of confirmed fuel-gas leaks assessed and dispositioned under an approved procedure, with overdue corrective actions escalated.
▶️ TODAY'S CRITICAL Ex QUESTION
A fuel-gas leak is detected near a boiler. The fixed gas detector has not alarmed. What is the correct engineering conclusion?
A. No alarm means no hazardous atmosphere.
B. Operation is safe while burner pressure is stable.
C. The release requires assessment and appropriate protective action.
D. An Ex-rated burner makes leakage acceptable.
Correct - C
Detector coverage, response thresholds and actual release conditions determine whether an alarm occurs. The absence of an alarm does not demonstrate the absence of a hazardous release.
⚡ DAILY Ex | CLOSING THOUGHT
A gas leak, a delayed maintenance action or an incorrectly interpreted monitoring signal may appear minor in isolation.
But these weaknesses can combine into a major accident.
For Heads of Operations, the priority is not simply to keep equipment running. It is to ensure that the conditions required for safe operation remain demonstrably effective.
Production availability must never depend on an unverified safety assumption.
That is Operational Ex