DAILY Ex - 13 NOVEMBER 2026
TODAY'S FOCUS: External threats can defeat internal safety barriers. Maritime explosions in the Strait of Hormuz, the vulnerability of industrial utilities during external attacks, and advances in modular Ex electrical equipment lead today's edition. We also look at an important research finding concerning explosion vent ducts and a maintenance lesson that applies directly to hazardous-area installations. For Heads of Operations: Explosion protection must remain effective not only during normal operation, but also when infrastructure is damaged, utilities are lost or emergency systems are challenged.

⚡ DAILY Ex | 13 NOVEMBER 2026
Explosion Protection | Operational Ex | Global Watch
TODAY'S FOCUS: External threats can defeat internal safety barriers.
Maritime explosions in the Strait of Hormuz, the vulnerability of industrial utilities during external attacks, and advances in modular Ex electrical equipment lead today's edition. We also look at an important research finding concerning explosion vent ducts and a maintenance lesson that applies directly to hazardous-area installations.
For Heads of Operations: Explosion protection must remain effective not only during normal operation, but also when infrastructure is damaged, utilities are lost or emergency systems are challenged.
🔴 1. STRAIT OF HORMUZ | Tanker explosions and fires
CURRENT INCIDENT REPORTS · 11–12 NOVEMBER
Iranian authorities reported explosions affecting four oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian state media attributed the incidents to naval mines, but Reuters could not independently verify that account.
Separately, UK Maritime Trade Operations reported a vessel struck by an unidentified projectile northwest of Ras Al-Khaimah on 11 November. An engine-room fire followed, and the crew evacuated safely.
Why it matters operationally: External impact can simultaneously damage containment, electrical supplies, fire protection and emergency communications.
These are not confirmed ATEX incidents. The relevant Ex question is whether subsequent hydrocarbon releases could create explosive atmospheres and whether protective systems would remain available.
Management action: Review emergency isolation, utility redundancy and damaged-equipment restart criteria at exposed marine terminals.
🔴 2. UKRAINE | Attacks on industrial and electrical infrastructure
CURRENT REPORTS · 12 NOVEMBER
Russia reported strikes against Ukrainian industrial facilities and electricity substations. Ukrainian authorities separately reported civilian infrastructure damage, casualties and fires following attacks.
The competing military claims have not all been independently verified.
Why it matters operationally: Loss of power or communications can affect ventilation, gas detection, inerting, cooling and emergency shutdown.
Management action: Verify which Ex-critical protective functions remain available during partial or complete utility failure, and which equipment must enter a safe state.
⚖️ 3. IECEx / ATEX | Edition 8 and international certification
STANDARDS AND CERTIFICATION WATCH · 2026
IEC 60079-0 Edition 8 has prompted testing and certification organisations to update their capabilities. Element's Skelmersdale laboratory announced readiness in July, highlighting changes involving electrostatic charging, marking, rotating-machine thermal protection and ingress protection.
The laboratory also reported US hazardous-location NRTL capability, demonstrating the importance of understanding different certification routes.
Why it matters operationally: IECEx, EU ATEX and North American hazardous-location approvals serve different regulatory purposes. Certification to one scheme is not automatically sufficient for every market.
Management action: Confirm the exact certification route, applicable standard edition and destination-country requirements before procurement.
🔬 4. RESEARCH | Explosion vent ducts can change protection performance
RESEARCH FINDING · SEPTEMBER 2026
Research published in the International Journal of Hydrogen Energy examined aluminium hydride dust explosions involving a vessel and vent duct.
The study investigated pressure development, flame propagation and reaction behaviour. The reported results demonstrate that explosion behaviour depends on both material concentration and venting geometry.
Why it matters operationally: An explosion vent duct is not merely an exhaust connection. Its geometry and resistance can influence the pressure experienced by protected equipment.
Engineering lesson: Changes to vent-duct length, bends or discharge arrangements require engineering reassessment using applicable validated design methods.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhydene.2026.157176
📘 5. UK | Maintenance isolation failure
HISTORICAL INCIDENT LEARNING · ENFORCEMENT SEPTEMBER 2026
The UK HSE reported that Samworth Brothers was fined £594,000 after two workers suffered serious scald injuries while replacing a gasket on steam pipework.
Investigators identified inadequate task assessment, unsuitable isolation arrangements and insufficient supervision. The incident was not an explosive-atmosphere event.
Why it matters operationally: The same isolation-management weaknesses can produce catastrophic consequences when the process material is flammable.
Management action: Require verified isolation and zero-energy confirmation before intrusive work, including contractor activities.
📅 6. UK | Hazards 36 approaches
UPCOMING · 17–19 NOVEMBER
IChemE's Hazards 36 conference in Manchester will bring together process-safety specialists for more than 100 technical presentations.
Themes include barrier assurance, hydrogen, ammonia, battery energy storage, artificial intelligence, human factors and major-accident learning.
Why it matters operationally: New industrial technologies require updated assumptions about ignition hazards, protective systems and operating competence.
https://www.icheme.org/training-events/hazards-process-safety-conference/
▶️ OPERATIONAL Ex USE CASE
THE TANK FARM - WHEN AN EXTERNAL EVENT DISABLES TWO SAFETY BARRIERS
ILLUSTRATIVE SCENARIO - NOT AN ACCOUNT OF THE REPORTED MARITIME INCIDENTS
A coastal fuel terminal operates storage tanks, transfer pumps, gas detectors and remotely operated emergency isolation valves.
An external impact damages a local electrical distribution panel.
Power is lost to several pumps, but the event also disables part of the gas-detection network and a valve-control system.
A small hydrocarbon release develops near a transfer manifold.
The pumps have stopped. But can the installation be considered safe?
Not automatically.
Stopping the pumps may reduce the release, but residual pressure, gravity flow or an open isolation path may allow continued leakage. A detector or shutdown valve that depends on the damaged supply may also be unavailable.
The critical question is whether the protective functions have been designed and verified for the relevant common-cause failure.
Owner: Operations Manager, supported by Electrical Engineering, Instrumentation and Process Safety.
Required evidence: Utility-failure analysis, cause-and-effect matrix, valve fail positions, emergency isolation tests, detector availability and emergency-response procedures.
STOP criterion: No restart until containment integrity and required protective functions are demonstrated.
Performance measure: 100% of identified safety-critical utility dependencies assessed, with corrective actions tracked to closure.
▶️ TODAY'S CRITICAL Ex QUESTION
An external event disables both a gas-detection system and an electrically actuated isolation valve. What is the critical engineering concern?
A. Whether the detector has an Ex certificate.
B. Whether the pumps stopped automatically.
C. Common-cause failure of the protective functions. ✅
D. Whether the control cabinet has sufficient IP rating.
Two apparently independent protective functions may share vulnerable power, control or communication infrastructure. Their combined failure must be assessed, including the actual fail-safe behaviour of final elements.
⚡ DAILY Ex | CLOSING THOUGHT
Explosion protection engineering traditionally focuses on identifying explosive atmospheres, preventing ignition and limiting explosion consequences.
Those fundamentals remain essential.
But recent events also demonstrate the need to consider how protective systems behave when external events damage the infrastructure on which they depend.
For Heads of Operations, a certified component is only one part of the answer.
The complete protective arrangement must remain effective-or achieve a defined safe state-when the conditions around it deteriorate.
That is Operational Ex.