DAILY Ex - 19 NOVEMBER 2026
TODAY'S FOCUS: An empty tank is not necessarily a gas-free tank. And a small fire is not necessarily a small warning. Two industrial incidents now provide important new evidence: a fatal explosion during tank cleaning in Indonesia and confirmation that two smaller fires preceded an explosion at a US hazardous-waste facility. For Heads of Operations, today's question is simple: Are we acting on early warning signs before they become major accidents?

⚡ DAILY Ex | 19 NOVEMBER 2026
Explosion Protection | Operational Ex | Global Watch
TODAY'S FOCUS: An empty tank is not necessarily a gas-free tank. And a small fire is not necessarily a small warning.
Two industrial incidents now provide important new evidence: a fatal explosion during tank cleaning in Indonesia and confirmation that two smaller fires preceded an explosion at a US hazardous-waste facility.
For Heads of Operations, today's question is simple: Are we acting on early warning signs before they become major accidents?
🔴 1. INDONESIA | Fatal explosion during refinery tank cleaning
CURRENT INCIDENT · 18 NOVEMBER
An explosion occurred at tank T-143 at the PPSDM Migas Cepu refinery training facility in Blora, Central Java, during maintenance and cleaning operations.
Indonesia's Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources confirmed that the refinery was not operating. One contractor suffered serious burns and subsequently died.
Police investigators suspect that residual gas remained inside the reportedly emptied tank. The exact ignition source and initiating sequence have not been established.
Why it matters operationally: Emptying a vessel does not establish that it is free of flammable vapours. Tank cleaning, opening, ventilation and maintenance may create hazardous conditions different from those assessed during production.
Management action: Require verified isolation, degassing, atmospheric testing, ignition-source control and contractor authorisation before tank entry or cleaning.
🔴 2. USA | Two earlier fires preceded Clean Harbors explosion
MATERIAL NEW FINDING · 18 NOVEMBER
The Harris County Fire Marshal's Office reported that the 17 November explosion at Clean Harbors' Deer Park facility involved ignition of hydrocarbon vapours inside a treatment vessel.
Investigators also identified evidence of two smaller fires involving the same hazardous-liquid-waste treatment process during the preceding week. In those incidents, vapours reportedly escaped the process before igniting.
One supervisor was hospitalised following the larger explosion. The fire was extinguished, and community air monitoring did not identify hazardous readings. The full root-cause investigation remains ongoing.
Why it matters operationally: Repeated small fires are evidence of an unresolved hazardous condition, not proof that existing controls are adequate.
Management action: Examine precursor-event reporting, nitrogen protection, vapour handling, ignition-source control and the authority to suspend operations after repeated abnormal events.
https://abc13.com/post/emergency-crews-respond-reports-explosion-la-porte-facility/20049749/
⚖️ 3. EU | Optical radiation and ATEX harmonisation
2026 STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT · COMPLIANCE WATCH
EN IEC 60079-28:2026, addressing protection of equipment and transmission systems using optical radiation, was added to the EU ATEX harmonised-standard references in September 2026. This remains relevant to the selection and conformity assessment of optical systems.
Why it matters operationally: Fibre-optic transmission, optical sensors and laser-based instruments can introduce ignition considerations that are not resolved solely by the electrical Ex certification of associated equipment.
Management action: Check optical power, fault conditions, protection concept and certification scope before modifying optical systems in hazardous areas.
🔬 4. RESEARCH | Industrial explosion consequences are not proportional to equipment size
RESEARCH WATCH · HAZARDS 36
The Hazards 36 technical programme includes work on small-scale industrial explosions involving volatile liquids and combustible dusts, alongside research on hydrogen, barrier effectiveness and consequence modelling.
These are conference research topics; findings should not be represented as established conclusions without examining the presented evidence.
Why it matters operationally: Small vessels, sample systems and pilot plants can generate dangerous pressure and flame effects, especially where confinement or connected equipment allows escalation.
Management action: Verify that laboratory, pilot-scale and small-batch equipment are included in explosion-risk assessments.
https://www.icheme.org/training-events/hazards-process-safety-conference/
⚙️ 5. TECHNOLOGY | Barrier monitoring must identify deterioration before failure
CURRENT INDUSTRY DISCUSSION · 19 NOVEMBER
Digital barrier management and operational risk visibility are prominent themes at Hazards 36, which concludes today in Manchester. The programme covers AI, digitalisation, hydrogen, battery energy storage and barrier assurance.
Why it matters operationally: Monitoring the existence of a protective system is not the same as confirming its availability and effectiveness.
Management action: Connect Ex inspection defects, failed tests, temporary bypasses and precursor incidents to decisions on continued operation.
📘 6. IECEx | Repair and inspection require different competence
EVERGREEN TECHNICAL PRACTICE
IEC 60079-17 addresses inspection and maintenance of Ex electrical installations; IEC 60079-19 addresses repair, overhaul and reclamation of Ex equipment.
Why it matters operationally: Finding a defect, deciding whether continued operation is acceptable, and approving a repair are different technical responsibilities.
Management action: Verify task-specific competence, access to original equipment documentation and authorised release-to-service decisions.
▶️ OPERATIONAL Ex USE CASE
THE ATEX INDUSTRIAL VACUUM - WHEN HOUSEKEEPING BECOMES A MACHINERY-COMPLIANCE DECISION
ILLUSTRATIVE SCENARIO · COMBUSTIBLE DUST
A food-processing plant uses an industrial vacuum cleaner to remove combustible powder deposits from machinery and floors.
The existing unit is replaced by a higher-capacity model to reduce cleaning time.
The new vacuum has greater suction and airflow, but its suitability for the actual dust, collection arrangement and hazardous-area conditions has not been demonstrated.
What could change? Dust entrainment, electrostatic charging, filter loading, internal dust-cloud formation, mechanical temperatures and the consequences of ignition inside the collector.
Critical decision: Confirm that the complete vacuum system-including hoses, accessories, filters and collection container-is suitable for the intended dust and hazardous-area conditions.
Owner: Operations and Maintenance, supported by the Ex Responsible Person.
Required evidence: Dust characteristics, hazardous-area classification, manufacturer instructions, equipment conformity documentation, electrostatic controls and approved cleaning procedure.
STOP criterion: Do not introduce the replacement vacuum until its suitability for the actual application has been verified.
KPI: 100% of industrial cleaning equipment changes subject to documented Ex suitability review.
▶️ TODAY'S CRITICAL Ex QUESTION
An industrial vacuum is marked for Zone 22 dust atmospheres. Can it automatically be used to collect combustible dust from inside a process vessel?
A. Yes, Zone 22 marking covers every dust application.
B. Yes, provided suction capacity is sufficient.
C. No, the internal collection hazards and intended use must also be assessed. ✅
D. Only if the vacuum has an Ex d motor.
External hazardous-area suitability does not automatically establish that the complete vacuum is suitable for collecting a particular combustible dust or for the internal atmosphere created during operation.
⚡ DAILY Ex | CLOSING THOUGHT
The Indonesian tank explosion and the new findings from the US hazardous-waste incident carry two important lessons.
An empty tank may still contain a flammable atmosphere.
A small fire may be the warning that prevents a much larger explosion.
For Heads of Operations, the real test of Operational Ex is whether abnormal conditions trigger timely technical assessment, operational restrictions and corrective action.
Do not wait for the major accident to confirm that an earlier warning mattered.