DAILY Ex - 26 SEPTEMBER 2026
A refinery shutdown after an external attack → hydrogen enters routine industrial operation → an Ex asset-tracking development → combustible-dust enforcement → maintenance isolation → one very practical Operational Ex use case.

⚡ DAILY Ex - 26 SEPTEMBER 2026
Explosion Protection | Operational Ex | Global Watch
Today: a refinery shutdown after an external attack → hydrogen enters routine industrial operation → an Ex asset-tracking development → combustible-dust enforcement → maintenance isolation → one very practical Operational Ex use case.
▶️ KEY DEVELOPMENT - WHAT HAPPENS TO Ex SAFETY WHEN A PLANT IS SUDDENLY DAMAGED?
CURRENT | Russia - 25 September
Industrial sites including the Novoshakhtinsk refinery and the Perm refinery were hit during overnight drone attacks on 24–25 September. Reported damage forced the Novoshakhtinsk refinery to halt operations; fires were also reported at industrial facilities.
https://en.h.ua/2026/09/25/drones-strike-russian-refineries-and-iskra-plant?utm
This is obviously an extraordinary external event rather than a conventional Ex failure. But it raises a very ordinary process-safety question. A hazardous-area facility can suddenly lose:
power → ventilation → gas detection → instrument air → inerting → cooling → containment → control systems.
The Ex question is therefore not only whether the plant is safe during normal production, it is more:
What state does the plant move into when several protection systems disappear simultaneously? Good Operational Ex includes a defined safe degraded state.
▶️ HYDROGEN - COMMERCIAL PRODUCTION STARTS AT ANTWERP
CURRENT | Belgium - 25 September
Commercial green-hydrogen production has started at the Port of Antwerp-Bruges NextGen District.
The first installation uses two 250-kW AEM electrolyser stacks and is designed to produce up to 70 tonnes of hydrogen annually, initially for mobility and industrial customers.
Why this matters to Ex professionals is less about the production number. Hydrogen installations are moving from demonstration projects towards ordinary industrial assets. That changes the conversation:
commissioning → leak management → inspection → detector testing → ventilation verification → maintenance → competence → MoC → ageing.
Hydrogen safety eventually becomes an Operations problem.
▶️ TECHNOLOGY - ASSET TRACKING IS ENTERING ZONE 1 / 21
Possible applications include tank containers, IBCs, hazardous-waste containers, chemical and pharmaceutical production assets and equipment moving through loading terminals.
The interesting Operational Ex opportunity is bigger than tracking location. Imagine connecting: asset ID → location → certificate → inspection → defect → repair → modification history.
Knowing where an Ex-related asset is becomes much more useful when we also know what condition it is in.
▶️ LEGAL / ENFORCEMENT - COMBUSTIBLE DUST DOES NOT NEED ITS OWN SPECIFIC LAW TO BECOME AN ENFORCEMENT ISSUE
REGULATORY PRACTICE | USA
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration combustible-dust enforcement programme remains a useful contrast to the ATEX model.
OSHA explicitly identifies combustible metal, wood, plastic, pharmaceutical, food, grain and other dusts as potential explosion hazards. Where significant combustible-dust hazards exist, enforcement can involve housekeeping requirements, electrical hazardous-location requirements and the General Duty Clause. https://www.osha.gov/enforcement/directives/cpl-03-00-006?utm
Why it matters globally:
Different countries reach explosion protection through different legal routes.
ATEX // DSEAR // NEC/NFPA // OSHA // local mining legislation // national petroleum regulations. But the engineering question remains:
Can an explosive atmosphere occur, and have credible ignition sources and explosion consequences been controlled?
Compliance scheme ≠ hazard. The hazard exists first.
▶️ MAINTENANCE - ISOLATION FAILURES KEEP REAPPEARING
RECENT ENFORCEMENT | UK
A food manufacturer was fined £594,000 this month after an employee and contractor were scalded while maintaining steam pipework.
The Health and Safety Executive found that the maintenance risk had not been adequately assessed and isolation/lock-off procedures were not followed.
This was not an Ex incident. But substitute: steam with: flammable gas / solvent / hydrogen / combustible powder and the same maintenance weakness can become the initiating event for an explosion.
Operational Ex therefore depends heavily on ordinary maintenance disciplines: isolate → depressurise → drain/purge → verify zero energy/material → work → reinstate → verify.
▶️ INCIDENT LEARNING - METAL DUST DESERVES RESPECT
HISTORICAL
OSHA's combustible-dust guidance makes an important point that remains frequently underestimated:
Even materials that are difficult to burn in bulk form can become explosible when sufficiently finely divided.
That includes metals such as: aluminium → magnesium → iron → zinc. https://www.osha.gov/combustible-dust?utm
This is increasingly relevant with: machining → polishing → additive manufacturing → powder handling → recycling.
Operational question: Has a new manufacturing technology quietly created a dust hazard that did not exist in the old process?
▶️ CSI - startup damage, fire five days later
Historical case: PEMEX Deer Park, Texas, 14 March 2023. Published in CSB Incident Reports, Volume One, January 2025, page 40.
A centrifugal pump experienced almost two hours of low suction pressure during startup. According to the CSB’s account of PEMEX’s investigation, cavitation damaged its bearings. Five days later, the mechanical seal failed, releasing hot hydrocarbons that ignited.
A high-priority vibration alarm had activated, but a replacement pump was unavailable. A more severe alarm was incorrectly programmed, and previous nuisance alarms had weakened operator confidence. Reported property damage exceeded $1 million.
https://www.csb.gov/assets/1/6/csb_incident_reports_volume_one_2025-01-14.pdf#page=40
The operational lesson is to connect abnormal startup conditions with subsequent equipment-health decisions. Continued production does not prove that damage has stopped developing.
Today’s management action
Owner: Maintenance Manager with Operations and the responsible Ex specialist. Select one transfer pump. Reconcile its installed configuration, IOM restrictions, spare-parts list, and response to loss of feed.
Measure: unresolved document mismatches, verified protective functions, and an owner and completion date for every gap.
Shift question: When this pump loses feed, what actually stops it—and when was that function last verified?
▶️ OPERATIONAL Ex USE CASE - THE FASTER PRODUCTION LINE
PRACTICAL USE CASE
Production wants 15% more throughput from a powder-handling line. No new equipment. Easy approval? Not necessarily. Higher throughput can mean: greater release rate → more airborne dust → higher duct loading → more deposits → changed ventilation effectiveness → different dust-collector loading → changed hazardous-area assumptions.
The key MoC question is therefore: “Did we change any parameter used to demonstrate the Ex-safe condition?”
Production rate itself can be an Ex parameter.
▶️ GOOD ENGINEERING PRACTICE - TEST THE FAILURE, NOT ONLY THE FUNCTION
During the next inspection, pick one protective system: gas detection // ventilation // inerting // pressurisation // dust extraction // explosion isolation.
We normally test: Does it work? Add another question: How do Operations know when it does NOT work?
Failure indication → alarm → responsible person → defined action → safe state. An invisible failed barrier is often more dangerous than an obvious failed machine.
▶️ TODAY'S Ex QUESTION
Pick one hazardous process.
Ask: “Which three things must remain available for us to continue operating safely?”
Perhaps: ventilation // nitrogen // gas detection.
Then ask: “What exactly happens if we lose two at the same time?”
If the answer depends on somebody improvising under pressure, the degraded operating condition may not yet be properly engineered.
Daily Ex
Ex compliance normally describes how the plant should operate.
Operational Ex must also define when the plant should no longer operate.