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Author: Veress Árpád · Explosion-protection expertDAILY Ex - 27 SEPTEMBER 2026
Four workers killed during welding at a coal site → a laboratory explosion under investigation → hydrogen added to an existing chemical complex → tomorrow’s process-safety meeting → repair competence → one simple hot-work use case.
⚡ DAILY Ex - 27 SEPTEMBER 2026
Explosion Protection | Operational Ex | Global Watch
Today: four workers killed during welding at a coal site → a laboratory explosion under investigation → hydrogen added to an existing chemical complex → tomorrow’s process-safety meeting → repair competence → one simple hot-work use case.
▶️ KEY INCIDENT - FOUR DEAD DURING WELDING WORK
CURRENT | Yakutia, Russia - 25/26 September
Four workers were killed and two injured after an explosion during welding work at the Elga coal deposit in Yakutia. Initial reports place the work at a backup pumping station near a vessel; investigators have opened a criminal case over possible safety-rule violations. Some early reporting refers to methane, but the precise explosion mechanism has not yet been independently established, so that should not be treated as the confirmed cause.
Why it matters operationally:
Welding is an obvious ignition source.
What is less obvious is everything connected to the work location:
vessel → pipe → drain → dead leg → neighbouring equipment → residual product → gas migration.
A hot-work permit should therefore answer more than:
“Is the atmosphere safe where the welder is standing?”
It should establish what can reach that location while the work is taking place.
▶️ INCIDENT - LABORATORY EXPLOSION IN BOGOTÁ
CURRENT | Colombia - 26 September
Three people were injured yesterday following an explosion at a laboratory in the industrial Los Mártires district of Bogotá.
The city's fire service attended with specialist resources. Preliminary reporting points toward compressed air, but the investigation is still at an early stage and the mechanism has not been confirmed.
Operational lesson:
Not every industrial explosion is a flammable-atmosphere explosion.
Pressure energy, chemical incompatibility, decomposition, runaway reaction and explosive atmosphere are very different mechanisms.
That distinction matters because:
wrong mechanism → wrong corrective action.
Investigate first. Classify the hazard second. Then select the protection.
▶️ HYDROGEN - NEW PRODUCTION UNIT ENTERS SERVICE AT AN EXISTING CHEMICAL SITE
CURRENT | France - 22 September
https://www.arkema.com/global/en/media/newslist/news/global/business/2026/20260922-inauguration-new-hydrogen-production-unit-jarrie/ has inaugurated a new hydrogen production unit at its Jarrie chemical site in France.
The roughly €10 million steam-methane-reforming unit was commissioned in July and now supplies hydrogen internally to the site, which produces hydrogen peroxide, chlorate and perchlorate. Further changes to hydrogen flows and raw-material supply are planned through 2027–28.
The interesting Ex issue is the brownfield interface. A new hydrogen unit does not exist in isolation.
It connects into an existing plant:
new source → existing pipework → users → ventilation → detection → isolation → operating procedures → emergency response.
For Operations, commissioning should therefore verify not only the new package but the changed system around it.
▶️ PROCESS SAFETY - HAZARDS AUSTRALASIA STARTS TOMORROW
CURRENT EVENT | Melbourne - 28–30 September
Institution of Chemical Engineers opens Hazards Australasia 2026 tomorrow at Melbourne's Marvel Stadium, alongside Chemeca.
The meeting brings Australian, New Zealand and international process-safety specialists together around lessons learned, new developments and integration of safety into industrial operations.
Why it matters to Ex:
Explosion protection becomes stronger when it is not treated as a separate electrical discipline.
HAC → process safety → ignition control → functional safety → human factors → mechanical integrity → emergency response.
The interfaces are often where the important risks sit.
https://www.icheme.org/training-events/hazards-australasia/
▶️ RESEARCH - HYBRID MIXTURES DESERVE MORE ATTENTION
CURRENT RESEARCH | Published 15 September
Recent peer-reviewed research in Scientific Reports investigated methane/coal-dust explosions initiated by high-temperature heat sources.
The study found that entrained coal dust can materially alter gas-explosion behaviour.
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-026-71737-2
Operational Ex point:
A process does not necessarily contain: a gas hazard OR a dust hazard.
It may contain: gas + dust = hybrid mixture.
This matters around dryers, coal systems, powder processing and processes where flammable vapour can coexist with particulate solids.
A HAC review should therefore ask:
Can two hazards that we assess separately actually occur simultaneously?
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-026-71737-2?utm
▶️ HISTORICAL INCIDENT LEARNING - ENGINEERING BARRIER vs PROCEDURE
RECENT FINAL INVESTIGATION | USA
One finding from the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board Shell Polymers Monaca report deserves to stay on Operations' radar.
The 2025 furnace explosion occurred when two isolation valves were inadvertently opened, allowing flammable cracked gas to backflow into a furnace containing lit pilots.
The CSB found that the relevant hazard was being managed with numerous administrative controls and recommended identifying deviations controlled solely by administrative measures.
This gives us a useful hierarchy question: Can the operator make the wrong action?
If yes: Can engineering prevent it?
▶️ OPERATIONAL Ex USE CASE - HOT WORK BESIDE AN “EMPTY” VESSEL
PRACTICAL USE CASE
Maintenance needs to weld a support bracket beside a process vessel.
The vessel is:
isolated. drained. not operating.
Hot-work permit approved?
Not yet.
Ask: What remains inside?
Then: dead legs → sludge → absorbent deposits → connected drains → vents → neighbouring systems → possible gas migration.
And finally: How do we demonstrate that conditions remain safe throughout the job?
Gas test before work is a measurement in time.
It is not automatically a barrier for the next four hours.
▶️ GOOD ENGINEERING PRACTICE - DEFINE WHEN TO RE-TEST
Look at your hot-work permit today.
Does it clearly define what triggers another atmospheric test?
Break in work? Process change? Ventilation failure? Shift change? Opening another line? Weather change? Alarm? Loss of isolation?
If not, Operations may unintentionally treat: “safe at 08:00”
as meaning: “safe until the permit expires.”
Those are not the same statement.
▶️ TODAY'S Ex QUESTION
Find one hot-work job planned for this week.
Instead of asking: “Has the gas test been done?”
ask: “What could make this atmosphere unsafe after the gas test?”
That question changes the conversation from: permit compliance
to: dynamic control of ignition risk.
Daily Ex
An Ex-safe condition is not permanent.
Operations has to know what maintains it - and what can change it.