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Author: Veress Árpád · Explosion-protection expertDAILY Ex - 8 NOVEMBER 2026
TODAY'S FOCUS: Explosion protection must remain effective when external events challenge the installation. A developing maritime incident in the Strait of Hormuz, a chemical-plant explosion in the United States, and lessons from a major South Korean factory fire lead today's edition. We also examine a less frequently discussed Operational Ex problem: what happens to a nitrogen-inerted process when the nitrogen supply becomes unreliable? For Heads of Operations: A protective system must remain effective during abnormal conditions, utility failures and emergency shutdown—not only during normal production.
⚡ DAILY Ex | 8 NOVEMBER 2026
Explosion Protection | Operational Ex | Global Watch
TODAY'S FOCUS: Explosion protection must remain effective when external events challenge the installation.
A developing maritime incident in the Strait of Hormuz, a chemical-plant explosion in the United States, and lessons from a major South Korean factory fire lead today's edition.
We also examine a less frequently discussed Operational Ex problem: what happens to a nitrogen-inerted process when the nitrogen supply becomes unreliable?
For Heads of Operations: A protective system must remain effective during abnormal conditions, utility failures and emergency shutdown—not only during normal production.
🔴 1. STRAIT OF HORMUZ | Tanker fires following reported mine strikes
CURRENT NEWS - 7–8 November 2026
Iran's Revolutionary Guards Navy reported that two oil tankers caught fire after striking mines while navigating the Strait of Hormuz.
The announcement followed reports of explosions around Qeshm Island on 7 November.
Reuters reported that the circumstances surrounding the explosions remained unclear. The tanker-fire information was attributed to Iranian authorities and had not been independently established in the available report.
Why it matters operationally: External damage to a tanker or industrial installation can compromise containment and create secondary fire, vapour-release and explosion hazards.
For hazardous-cargo operations, emergency preparedness must address damaged tanks, loss of utilities, impaired isolation and potentially unsafe access.
Management action: Review emergency isolation and cargo-transfer shutdown arrangements, particularly where external damage could affect several protective systems simultaneously.
🔴 2. USA | Chemical-plant explosion prompts community shelter order
RECENT INCIDENT - 4 November 2026
An explosion at the Loveland Products chemical plant in Greenville caused a fire involving a herbicide chemical.
Authorities instructed nearby residents to shelter indoors because of potentially hazardous smoke.
No injuries were reported. The fire was extinguished, and environmental authorities arranged air monitoring.
The initiating explosion mechanism was not established in the initial reporting.
Why it matters operationally: Explosion consequences can extend beyond the installation boundary.
Management action: Verify that emergency plans address chemical inventories, potential off-site consequences, community warnings and coordination with emergency services.
https://apnews.com/article/e8d2cf7ce9adc56e83a1036600b67ae9
📘 3. SOUTH KOREA | Reactive chemicals complicate emergency response
HISTORICAL INCIDENT LEARNING - 20 March 2026
A major fire at an automotive-parts factory in Daejeon killed 14 workers and injured dozens.
Emergency responders encountered additional hazards associated with approximately 200 kg of sodium and other chemicals.
The presence of reactive materials complicated firefighting operations, requiring special precautions before water could be used in affected areas.
The initiating cause of the fire was not established in the cited reporting.
Why it matters operationally: A conventional fire can become a more complex emergency when reactive chemicals are present.
Historical lesson: Emergency responders need accurate information about hazardous substances, their locations and incompatible extinguishing methods.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/21/south-korea-fire-daejeon-car-parts-factory
⚖️ 4. ATEX / IEC | Equipment certification and abnormal atmospheres
STANDARDS WATCH - Published June 2026; not a new November revision
https://webstore.iec.ch/en/publication/71519 establishes general construction, testing and marking requirements for Ex equipment.
The standard atmospheric conditions relevant to explosion characteristics include:
* Temperature: −20°C to +60°C.
* Pressure: 80–110 kPa.
* Normal atmospheric oxygen content, typically 21% by volume.
Equipment used outside these conditions may require additional technical consideration.
Why it matters operationally: Inerted, oxygen-enriched or unusual-pressure processes cannot automatically rely on equipment assessments made for normal atmospheric conditions.
The applicable equipment certification, process conditions and protective measures must be considered together.
Management action: Identify installations where the actual process atmosphere differs from the assumptions used in equipment selection.
📘 5. IECEx | Inspection and repair after abnormal events
CERTIFICATION AND COMPETENCE PRACTICE
Following an explosion, fire, flooding event or significant mechanical impact, the continued suitability of affected Ex equipment must be established before return to service.
IEC 60079-17 provides the framework for inspection and maintenance of electrical installations in hazardous areas.
IEC 60079-19 addresses repair, overhaul and reclamation of Ex equipment.
IECEx service-facility certification provides additional assurance of competence and quality management within a defined certification scope.
Why it matters operationally: Equipment that remains electrically functional after an incident may nevertheless have lost its explosion-protection integrity.
Management action: Establish a post-incident assessment procedure covering damage, protection concepts, certification limitations, repair decisions and documented release authorisation.
🔬 6. ENGINEERING | Common-cause failures in explosion prevention
TECHNICAL PRACTICE
Many explosion-prevention arrangements depend on utilities or supporting systems.
Examples include nitrogen supply, instrument air, cooling water, ventilation, electrical power and process-control systems.
A single utility failure may affect several protective measures simultaneously.
For example, loss of instrument air could affect isolation valves while also impairing other process-control functions.
Why it matters operationally: Multiple safeguards are not necessarily independent simply because they appear separately on a process diagram.
Engineering lesson: Review common-cause failures, protective-system independence, failure positions and the time available to achieve a safe state.
📅 7. UK | Hazards 36 approaches
UPCOMING EVENT - 17–19 November 2026
Hazards 36 will take place in Manchester.
The conference addresses major-hazard management, process-safety engineering, operational risk and lessons from industrial incidents.
Why it matters operationally: Technical protection must be supported by management systems that maintain barrier effectiveness throughout the installation lifecycle.
▶️ OPERATIONAL Ex USE CASE
The nitrogen-inerted process loses its nitrogen supply
PRACTICAL | Illustrative scenario
A chemical-processing facility operates a closed powder-handling system.
Nitrogen inerting is used to maintain the oxygen concentration below a validated safe operating limit.
The system includes oxygen monitoring, pressure control and protective interlocks.
During production, the nitrogen supply pressure begins to decrease.
The process remains operational.
The oxygen analyzer still indicates an acceptable concentration.
Can production continue?
Not automatically.
The protective arrangement must account for nitrogen-supply failure, potential air ingress, analyzer response time, measurement location and the time required to achieve a safe state.
An oxygen concentration below the specified limit at one measurement point does not necessarily demonstrate that the complete process remains adequately inerted.
The assessment must consider the applicable limiting oxygen concentration, safety margin, process conditions and credible abnormal events.
Required decision: Engineering must establish the minimum acceptable nitrogen-supply conditions and define the protective response when those conditions cannot be maintained.
Depending on the process, this may require stopping powder transfer, isolating equipment, preventing further combustible-material introduction or initiating a validated shutdown sequence.
Owner: Head of Operations, supported by Process Engineering, Instrumentation and the Ex Responsible Person.
Required evidence: Inerting design basis, oxygen-limit assessment, nitrogen-supply failure analysis, instrument verification, protective-function testing and operating procedures.
STOP criterion: Do not continue production when the required inerting conditions cannot be demonstrated.
Measure: 100% of safety-critical inerting functions verified against defined operating limits and failure scenarios.
▶️ TODAY'S Ex QUESTION
A nitrogen-inerted powder-handling system experiences falling nitrogen pressure, but the oxygen analyser still reads below the specified limit. What is the correct operational decision?
A. Continue production because the oxygen reading is acceptable.
B. Continue until the oxygen concentration reaches the limiting oxygen concentration.
C. Verify that the required inerting conditions remain satisfied and initiate the specified protective response if they cannot be maintained.
D. Disable the nitrogen-pressure alarm if the oxygen analyzer is functioning.
Correct answer: C.
An acceptable oxygen reading alone does not demonstrate that the inerting system can maintain the required protective conditions.
⚡ DAILY Ex | CLOSING THOUGHT
Today's developments highlight an important distinction between equipment compliance and operational resilience.
An installation may have certified equipment, documented hazardous-area classification and correctly designed protective systems.
But external damage, utility failure, unexpected chemical interactions or emergency conditions can challenge the assumptions on which those systems depend.
For Heads of Operations, the critical question is:
What happens when the system responsible for preventing an explosion is itself no longer reliable?
Explosion protection must include the ability to recognise deteriorating conditions, initiate effective protective actions and prevent unsafe restart.
A protective measure is only dependable when its failure has also been considered.
That is Operational Ex.