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Author: Veress Árpád · Explosion-protection expertDAILY Ex - 14 SEPTEMBER 2026
Two cases, one operational question. A CSB investigation into a fatal reactor explosion found the emergency relief system would have needed to be roughly four times larger for the runaway scenario it faced. A far smaller example makes the same point: adding two forklifts to an existing charging area raises simultaneous hydrogen generation and therefore ventilation demand. In both, the barrier exists but the load on it has moved past what was demonstrated. If that cannot be recalculated and verified, the decision belongs before the change rather than after the incident.
What changed + what happened + one Operational Ex decision
1. What changed - IECEx Annual Meetings start today in Beijing
The 2026 IECEx Annual Meetings begin today, 14 September, in Beijing. The week includes Assessor Training, ExSFC, ExTAG, ExPCC, the Industrial Symposium and ExMC meetings through 18 September.
This matters because these are the forums where certification practice, technical interpretation, competence and system-level implementation are discussed and aligned.
Operational Ex comment: “Will any outcome change how we select, install, inspect, maintain, repair or authorize Ex equipment?”
When it does, the change needs to reach the Ex Register, procedures, competence requirements and verification practice — not stop at the certification department.
2. What happened - the process hazard was bigger than the safeguard
At the Givaudan Sense Colour facility in Louisville, a runaway decomposition reaction in a caramel-colouring reactor caused a catastrophic explosion in November 2024. Two workers died and three were seriously injured.
The CSB found that the company had not adequately understood the reactive hazard. The reactor’s emergency relief system was incapable of handling the runaway reaction and would have needed to be around four times larger for that scenario. The reactor had also been relocated and modified before being put into service at the site.
Operational Ex comment: It is a reminder that protection systems only work for the hazards they were actually designed for.
For Head of Operations: material/process change → hazard review → safeguard capability → operating limits → MoC/PSSR → authorization
A relief valve, ventilation system or Ex device is not automatically an adequate barrier simply because it exists.
3. One Operational Ex use case - “Two more forklifts are arriving next month.”
Today’s Head of Operations question: “We are adding two forklifts. Can we just charge them in the existing charging area?”
Every additional battery that can be charged simultaneously adds to the potential hydrogen generation. This example therefore evaluates the required ventilation per charging position and in total, then compares that combined demand with the existing ventilation capacity.
The real decision is: 2 more forklifts → more simultaneous charging → more hydrogen → higher ventilation demand
So before the forklifts arrive: define maximum simultaneous charging → calculate ventilation requirement → compare with actual ventilation → review ignition-source controls → MoC → authorize
If the ventilation margin disappears, Operations has choices: increase ventilation / limit simultaneous charging / change layout or charging regime - but simply adding the chargers is not one of them.
Operational Ex comment: The operating load changes, and that alone can move the installation outside its demonstrated safe condition.
What Operations should do: Know what your barriers were designed to handle.
A reactor safeguard was undersized for the real hazard.
A charging area receives additional load.
In each case, the operational question is: “Has the demand on the barrier changed beyond the condition we originally demonstrated as safe?”
If yes: assess → authorize → implement → verify → update evidence → operate
If you cannot demonstrate the barrier still works: STOP before the change, not after the incident.